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The recent case of SB has visited upon the English judiciary the
seemingly intractable issue of headscarves - when they can be worn,
and when they cannot.' Much of the rest of Europe, and beyond, has
been similarly visited. The apparent intractability is a common
experience. The purpose of this article is to present three headscarf
"stories," and in so doing, stress the narrative nature of this intensely
moral and political, as well as legal, controversy. Narrativity, it will
be suggested, offers a far more effective means of approaching this
kind of issue and its inevitable indeterminacies than the simple
recourse to blunt legal instrumentation. While the law must, it seems,
play a role in attempting to resolve the agonistic tensions that revolve
around the wearing, or not, of headscarves, there is value in properly
appreciating the law's limitations.
I. Three Narratives
Shabina's Story
Our first narrative begins in Luton at the beginning of the new
school year in 2002. Like most schools in England, Denbigh High
* Ian Ward is a Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, where he
teaches Public Law, European Union Law and Legal Theory. He has published a
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relation of law, politics and literature.
1. The Queen on the Application of SB v. Headteacher and Governors of
Denbigh High School, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 199, 2005 2 All E.R. 396 (EWCA (Civ))
(Eng.).
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School, in Luton, believes that making pupils wear certain types of
clothing will enhance their educational experience; if not making
them any brighter, at least making them a little more conformable,
and apparently safer, presumably from each other, and from the
ravages of the consumer society into which they are born.2 To that
end, Denbigh High School has a dress code - lots of white and navy
blue, together with guidance on what kind of garments Muslim girls in
particular can wear. In short, they are permitted to wear a shalwar
kameeze, together with headscarves, provided the latter is lightweight,
a nice shade of navy, and does not obscure the white and navy-ness of
their school collar and tie.3
Shabina Begum claims that, for Muslim women who have started
to menstruate, the shalwar kameeze does not comply with the strict
requirements of her faith. Begum chose to wear, instead, a jilbab,
which covered up her arms, legs and all the navy blue. So, in
September 2002, she arrived at Denbigh High School in a jilbab. She
did so accompanied by her brother, who had strong views on the
subject, and by another person, described rather elusively by the
Court as a "young man," and "threatening." The assistant
headteacher told Shabina to go home and change into something that
would more obviously enhance her educational experience and which
was, presumably, bluer. Shabina, her brother, and the other young
man went home, the men saying they would not compromise on the
issue.'
Shabina sought a judicial review of the decision of the
headteacher and governors, requesting in particular a remedial
declaration. Her application before Bennett J in the Administrative
Court, on June 1, 2004, was dismissed. Shabina appealed to the Court
of Appeal, which gave its judgment on March 2, 2005. On this
occasion, she succeeded - in a way.
The Court considered various issues raised by both parties. The
2. Id. at $ 4. Brooke L recounted that the headteacher, "believes that a school
uniform forms an integral part of the school's drive for high standards and continuous
improvement," as well as promoting a "positive ethos and sense of community
identity" and ensuring "that students are dressed in a way that is safe, practical and
appropriate for learning." Id. It was further argued that the uniform prevents those
who cannot afford the "latest designer items" from being "disadvantaged." Id.
3. Id. at m1 5-7.
4. Id. at $ 8, 14-15. Interestingly, Shabina was duly accepted by a different
school that was prepared to let her wear the jilbab, which reinforces the sense of
contingency which surrounds both her particular case and the wider issue it uncovers.
Id. at % 16.
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first related to whether Shabina Begum had been actually excluded.
In the Administrative Court, Bennett J had decided that Begum had
not been excluded, at least not in terms defined by the Guidance
issued by the Department for Education and Science. He preferred,
instead, to see Begum as excluding herself by choosing not to wear
the school uniform. The Court of Appeal, in the person of Brooke
LJ, quickly rejected this piece of jurisprudential construction. The
question then arose as to whether the exclusion was justified.
It was here that the Court immersed itself in the jurisprudence of
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Article 9 holds that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedom of others.
In disputed matters, such as those raised by the facts of SB, and,
as we shall see, cases such as Sahin, courts are left to balance the first
section of Article 9 with the second. In considering the implications
of Article 9, the Court in SB noted the nature of this balancing
exercise, alluding, not just to Sahin, but to cases such as Kokkinakis
and Dahlab? Much, it seemed, would swing on Article 9.
At the same time, however, the Court ventured gamely into the
hazardous stretches of Islamic culture and theology, as well as
sympathizing, at length, with those teachers and governors of
Denbigh High School who had done likewise. In his leading
judgment, Brooke LJ noted the multicultural nature of the School,
and, in passing, its headteacher.6  He also noted the various
interpretations of Islamic or sharia law regarding female clothing, the
weight of which seemed to suggest that the shalwar kameeze
5. Id. at 11 26, 63 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct.. H.R. (ser. A) 1
(1993) and Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447). The Court of Appeal
used Kokkinakis as authority for how seriously Article 9 rights should be considered
- indeed, as an essential foundation of a democratic society.
6. The Queen on the Application of SB, supra note 1, at $ 1-4.
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constituted appropriate dress in the context of school dress codes.7
Confessing the "superficiality" of his opinion on these matters,
Brooke U delved into the relevant sections of the Koran, and came
out thoroughly confused, unable to reconcile the alternative
interpretive opinions of the "very strict" and the "liberal"
theologians.'
The Court, and Brooke LJ, decided to move on, satisfied at least
that Shabina had been prevented from manifesting her religion.
Returning to Article 9, it wondered whether the exclusion could then
be justified in terms of public interest. Considerable weight appeared
to lie with the evidence of the assistant head who had dispatched the
threatening, if anonymous, young man back in September 2002. He
confirmed that certain "non-Muslim pupils" said they were "afraid"
of people "wearing the jilbab," as it was "associated with extreme
views." He further confirmed that some Muslim girls also "indicated"
that the wearing of a jilbab would "identify them as belonging to
extreme Muslim sects." 9 The Court also revisited the evidence of the
deputy headteacher, who had opined that "many adolescents require
a lot of support to understand the importance of inclusion,"
something which can be "fostered" by a school uniform policy;
though not, presumably, those who find themselves excluded for not
wearing it. And then, with no greater sense of irony, added that the
young need to be protected from those who would use "peer
pressure" to make them conform. °
Brooke LJ then gave his judgment, and pretty much ignored
everything that had gone before on the actual matter of what Shabina
Begum should have been allowed to wear. Returning to Article 9 and
the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, he noted the considerable
"margin of appreciation" that existed in these cases when considering
the impact of Section 2 of the Article. In doing so, he dwelt at some
length on Sahin v Turkey; a case we shall examine in the second part
of this article. From Sahin, Brooke LJ concluded that "context is all-
important." In this case, as we shall see, the Strasbourg Court
recognized that an issue of such cultural import clearly lay within the
"margin of appreciation" suggested by the public interest defense
given in Section 2. And it was here that Brooke LJ decided that the
7. Id. at 1 28, 31-34, 40-44, 48.
8. Id. at 1131,48.
9. Id. at $ 51.
10. Id. at % 54.
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case should be decided.
Decided, but not in any earth-shattering way. After venturing
into the niceties of Islamic culture and the European Convention, the
Court preferred an altogether more limited basis for its actual
judgment. It held that the Headteacher and School Governors had
misdirected themselves as to the questions that such a "decision-
making structure" should properly ask itself with regard to the
implications of Article 9. The School had failed to recognize the
existence of the basic Article 9 right, and thus failed, too, to justify it
in terms of Article 9 Section 2. After all the to-ing and fro-ing, the
Court agreed that a declaration could be granted "regardless of the
rights and wrongs of what actually happened."'"
There are two ways of receiving the Court's judgment; either it
shamefully hid behind a technicality or it wisely hid behind a
technicality. The first reaction is likely to be advanced by those who
have a strongly held view on the matter, either for political or
theological reasons, and who cling, rather sweetly, to the delusion
that courts of law can resolve this kind of issue, can locate some kind
of truth, or at least a 'right answer.' The second reaction will be
voiced by those who suspect that the limits of the law are reached in
cases like this, and that the court, thought it was loath to admit as
much, at least realized this.
The sense of jurisprudential anticlimax is reinforced by the
Court's willingness, having ducked the deeper moral and political
issues, to then opine, in suitably vague terms, on the possibility of
schools being permitted to exclude students in similar circumstances,
provided they first direct themselves appropriately in the context of
Article 9. Indeed, it was pretty much the only addition that
Mummery U felt impelled to contribute to his colleague's leading
judgment. 12 Although, like both Brooke LJ and Scott Baker U, he
thought there was a strong case for schools being given clearer
guidance by government. Here, Scott Baker LJ seemed particularly
moved to advertise his 'considerable sympathy' for Denbigh High
School, its head and governors.13 But not so moved as to provide
much guidance himself.
The journey from Luton to the Court of Appeal took two and a
half years and encompassed various aspects of Islamic culture and
11. Id. at $$ 75-76, 78.
12. Id. at $T 81, 85-6.
13. Id. at $ 91.
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theology, together with that of the Strasbourg Court. But the sense of
anticlimax is tangible. This is not necessarily a criticism of the
judgment. For anticlimax tends to be the bedfellow of indeterminacy,
and the depth of political, cultural, and theological dissonance which
surrounds issues such as headscarves is peculiar in its seeming
indeterminacy. But not everyone is so easily reconciled to the
irreconcilable. For while the journey from Luton to the Strand might
have meandered, the journey from the Strand to the living rooms of
England was altogether more rapid, and more excitable.
By March 3, 2005, the narrative of SB had taken a very different
turn. Gone were the jurisprudential niceties, the careful countenance
of what Article 9 might mean, the relevant bits of the Koran, or when
a declaratory remedy is appropriate. In its place could be found a
threat, not just to English schoolrooms, but to English culture itself
(whatever that might be thought to be). Pictures of Islamic girls in all
kinds of dress were splattered around the newspapers. The most
moderate response, perhaps predictably, could be found in the
Guardian, which even allowed Shabina to express her own opinion;
an opinion, interestingly, which was couched in terms of a "victory for
all Muslims who wish to preserve their identity and values despite
prejudice and bigotry." It also noted that the Court had decided the
matter on a "technicality." This did not stop the newspaper, however,
from holding that a "landmark" decision had been reached.' The
Daily Telegraph elected to seek out the opinion of various citizens of
Luton, most of whom enjoyed some sort of association with Denbigh
High School, and thus attempt to clothe any potentially bigoted
response in the vestments of someone else's opinion. There were
plenty of opinions, but no consistency, and not a lot of coherence
either. 5
The tabloids, however, were not so given to the search for
balance, or at least the outward appearance of it. The Daily Express
also gave voice to Shabina's opinions on bigotry, at least in truncated
form, but preferred to dwell on her anxieties about Islamic culture
within the context of the 'war on terror.' It also bemoaned the fact
that the school might have to pay costs. Editorial comment was less
reserved, and rued the probability that the decision had ended the
14. Michelle Pauli, Schoolgirl Tells Guardian of Her Battle to Wear Islamic Dress,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 3,2005, at 1.
15. Nicole Martin and Amy Iggulden, Town Divided by Battle to Wear Islamic
Dress, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 3, 2005, at 4.
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tradition of school uniforms.' 6 This latter view also rooted the rather
more vociferous complaint of the The Daily Mail; the site of the most
extreme, willfully ignorant and prejudiced, and thus also entertaining
and frightening approach to the vexed issues arising from the case.
Under the headline "Is This the End of School Uniform?" the
Mail contemptuously ignored the various agonies the Court had
undergone in order to avoid actually making any substantive
judgment on the issue. Instead, it opined that the three judges had
"effectively" ended centuries of school uniform codes. Not that the
judges were really to blame. Or even Shabina. The fault it seemed
chiefly lay with Shabina's barrister, Cherie Blair, who led the "fight"
against the school and its English values of discipline and tolerance,
and the Human Rights Act which her husband, the Prime Minister,
had introduced into British law.'7 The Mail expressed its sympathies
for the headteacher, who was herself the "living embodiment of
multi-culturalism," or at least the kind of 'multi-culturalism' which
the Mail preferred to recommend. Various "leading Muslims" were
quoted as expressing their horror at the judgment, while certain
"extremist" Muslims were quoted as welcoming it. One Tory
councilor expressed his horror at the result, and blamed "European
laws," which had "overtaken the laws of the land."' 8 It was just
possible to hear the sound of thousands of breakfast tables being
banged in rhythm across the shires of middle England.
Leyla's Story
Leyla Sahin wished to become a doctor, and so she enrolled at
the medical school of Istanbul University. Her family, she testified,
was conservative and deeply religious, and they and she considered it
her religious duty to the wear the Islamic headscarf. In February
1998, the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which
declared that any students whose "heads are covered" should be
16. Editorial, THE EXPRESS (London), Mar. 3, 2005, at 5.
17. And lurking behind Cherie were the "friends of Cherie," most notably the
Children's Legal Centre which, to use the vernacular once more, had "form." The
Centre, the Mail sniffed, had been known to support the children of asylum seekers,
and even help the Romanian authorities reform their own schemes of adoption and
childcare policies. Is This the End of School Uniform?, THE DAILY MAIL (London),
Mar. 3, 2005, at 8.
18. Schools in Chaos Over Uniforms, THE DAILY MAIL (London), Mar. 3, 2005,
at 8.
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excluded from University courses.' 9 The following month, Leyla
turned up for her oncology exam and was told to go away. The same
thing happened a couple of days later, when she tried to enroll in a
course on orthopedic traumatology. In due course, over the next
couple of months, she was further excluded from lectures on
neurology and an examination on public health. Disciplinary
proceedings, some of which were directed to a number of students,
including Leyla, who had participated in demonstrations against the
Vice-Chancellor's declaration, were conducted during the rest of 1998
and spring 1999. Finally, in June 1999, Leyla was formally
suspended.20
Leyla duly applied to the Istanbul Administrative Court for an
order setting aside the February circu!ar, and to have the disciplinary
proceedings and suspension quashed. In November 1999, her
application was rejected, on the basis that the Vice-Chancellor had
acted in accordance with the powers regulated in Section 13b of the
Higher Education Act." In April 2001, the Turkish Supreme
Administrative Court dismissed her appeal from the Istanbul Court.
Leyla moved to Austria, and enrolled in the medical faculty at Vienna
University instead, where there was no comparable code regarding
student dress. The legal issue, however, was not so readily resolved.
Thwarted in Ankara, Leyla's story took flight and landed in
Strasbourg. Here, on June 29, 2004, the European Court of Rights
gave its judgment. Leyla was thwarted again.
The Strasbourg Court declined to challenge the ruling of the
Turkish courts concerning interpretations of its own constitutional
and legal principles. Primary amongst these, it acknowledged, was
Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution, which enshrines the principle of
laik, or laicism. This latter principle, which seeks to distinguish
between the 'people' and the 'clergy,' was one of the original six
'arrows' of Kemalism. 2  Rather than overtly seeking to suppress
religion, it prefers to claim secular jurisdiction over the regulation of
state and religion. The distinction is a fine, arguably specious, one. It
claims the jurisdiction to regulate the making of religious statements
in public offices and institutions. The wearing of headscarves, or not,
19. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), available at
<www.echr.coe.int/echr>.
20. Id. $l 17-20.
21. Id. at 15 (considering Law no. 2547).
22. See Andrew Davidson, Turkey, a "Secular" State?: The Challenge of
Description, 102 S. ATLANTIC Q. 333, 334-44 (2003) (discussing Turkish laicism).
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falls, very obviously, into this category.
Moreover, as Leyla's lawyers argued, this presumption might be
thought to contravene the right to equal treatment "without any
distinction based on language, race, color, sex, political opinion,
philosophical belief, religion, membership of a religious sect or other
similar grounds" found in Article 10 of the same Constitution. A
similar sentiment was echoed in Article 24, Section 1, which
confirmed a "right to freedom of conscience, belief and religious
conviction." However, these latter rights were compromised by
statements found in Articles 14 and 24, Section 2, which held that
their exercise was subject to the overriding need to prevent the
"undermining" of the principles and "integrity" of the Turkish state.23
As is so often the case with written constitutions, different bits could
be played against each other. And it was left to the judges in
Strasbourg to try to make some sense of all this.
Given its symbolic importance, both culturally and religiously,
headwear, both for men and for women, has long attracted legislative
regulation in Turkey.2' The intensely secular tone of the Kemalist
Constitution makes little attempt to accommodate the resultant
tensions. Headgear and Dress laws were enacted in 1925 and 1934,
and then revised over the intervening decades, while various other
kinds of legislation which seek to regulate public institutions,
including educational establishments, have been written in their
shadow. As the Strasbourg Court discovered, these statutes have also
been the frequent subject of litigation, particularly as the particular
issue of wearing headscarves gained political and popular notoriety
during the 1980s.
25
In March 1989, for example, the Turkish Constitutional Court
struck down Section 16 of the 1988 Higher Education Act, which has
explicitly accepted that headscarves might be worn, holding that it
was contrary to Article 2 of the Constitution. The manifesting of
religious affinity was contrary to the overarching principle of
secularism that, the Court opined, defined the modern Turkish state.26
A 1990 version of the Act was redrafted, so that Article 17 now stated
23. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at 91 26.
24. This headscarf legislation can be aligned with that which sought, at various
moments in modern Turkish history, to regulate the wearing of turbans and fezzes.
For an entertaining and informing overview, see JEREMY SEAL, A FEZ OF THE
HEART, (Harcourt Brace 1996) (1995).
25. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at 29, 31.
26. Id. at 91 33-5.
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that "choice of dress shall be free" in institutions of higher education,
but only "provided that it does not contravene the laws in force." In
a judgment the following year, the Constitutional Court held that the
wearing of headscarves was, accordingly, "contrary to the principles
of secularism and equality."27  Throughout the 1990s, Turkish
universities, including Istanbul, had issued declarations, such as that
which Leyla Sahin challenged, on the basis of the Higher Education
Act and the opinions of the Constitutional Court. The power to issue
these declarations was itself authorized by Section 13 of the Act .
In passing, it is worth noting that the Constitutional Court has
long seen itself as the guardian of the principles of secularism and
laicism, in essence of the spirit of Kemalism. And it has done so most
fervently at moments when it has perceived these principles to be
most threatened. 9  Of course, it can be argued that the recent
electoral success of Recep Tayyep Erdogan's Justice and
Development Party, or AKP, represents just such a moment. The
present attitude of the AKP government towards women is avowedly
conservative in tone; something which leads it, unavoidably, into
association, not just with the cause of those who support the reversal
of a ban on headscarves, but with its rebellious overtone. And it is,
notably, avowedly opaque as well. Caught amidst the desire to
articulate the frustrations of its generally Islamic popular support,
but reluctant to irritate secular and laicist sympathies, AKP
statements have preferred to consider the issue of "headscarves" on a
"different plane" to the party political, with its former Premier
Abdullah Gul projecting, rather optimistically, a Turkey in which
the "Islamic headscarf and the miniskirt walk together hand in
hand., 3' A suitably confused metaphor for an intensely confused,
and confusing, issue; for this is not, as we shall see shortly, an area of
27. Id. at [ 37-8.
28. Id. at 40-51.
29. Most notoriously, perhaps, is the successive banning of the Welfare and
Virtue Parties in 1997 and 2001. In both instances the Court saw itself as defending
the secular principle against Islamic leaning parties. For an overview, see Mustafa
Kocak & Esin Oricui, Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of Democracy:
Cases from Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights, 9 EUR. PUB. LAW 399
(2003).
30. See, e.g., AMIKAM NACHMANI, TURKEY: FACING A NEW MILLENNIUM,
COPING WITH INTERTWINED CONFLICTS 96 (Manchester UP, 2003); Ahmet Insel, The
AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, 102 S. ATLANTIC Q. 293, 304-5 (2003);
Simten Cosar & Aylin Ozman, Centre-right Politics in Turkey after the November




any political or moral clarity.
Like Shabina Begum, Leyla Sahin argued that these intensely
secular instruments infringed her religious principles and rights - not
just those written into Articles 10 and 24 of the Turkish Constitution,
but also those found in Article 9 of the European Convention, to
which Turkey is a signatory. The wearing of a headscarf, she
contested, was precisely such a right, one that was required by her
religious belief.3' While it recognized the import of Article 9 as a
foundation of "democratic society," citing cases such as Kokkinakis
and Buscarini for the view that it encompasses freedoms to manifest
religious belief, the Court was not persuaded that it justified what
would have amounted to striking down the central principle of
Turkish constitutionalism. The principle of the "margin of
appreciation" loomed large. Its application was, of course, invited, as
we have already noted, by Section 2 of Article 9 of the Convention
which justified those "limitations" as "necessary" for protecting
"public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
Leyla's lawyers argued that no such necessity existed, as the
wearing of a headscarf did not "challenge republican values." The
Turkish government responded that in regulating religious symbolism
and dress, it was in fact preserving the political neutrality of its public
institutions. The wearing of headscarves, the government implied,
represented a militant act of resistance to the principle of secularism.33
The notion of political neutrality is not an easy one to defend, though
the Court went out of its way to approve the argument that the
principles of 'secularism' and 'pluralism,' which it assumed to be
consonant with it, were deserving of particular support. In the same
breath, interestingly, the Court developed its argument, first, by
insinuating that the duties apparently prescribed by Islamic dress
codes might themselves be 'perceived' as being 'compulsory,' and
thus by definition against the broad principle of liberty of conscience;
and second, by giving explicit approval to the argument that
secularism is a particular tool for the promotion of gender equality in
Turkey.3'
31. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at 71.
32. Id. at $ l 64-7, 81 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct.. H.R. (ser. A) 1
(1993)); Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, 1999-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 605.
33. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at $$ 94, 96.
34. Id. at 106-8, 110.
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But this was not, once again, the real driver of the Court's
opinion. The heart of the judgment was rooted in the "margin of
appreciation." The Strasbourg Court was certainly not inclined to
second-guess what the Turkish state and its courts decided was
"necessary" for its preservation, and so held, accordingly, that the
University had a "basis" in domestic law to issue its declarations, and
that, moreover, such declarations were "legitimate" within Turkish
law and thus "proportionate" in terms of the second section of Article
9 of the Convention. 5 Approving its own "margin of appreciation"
jurisprudence, including cases such as Handyside and Kokkinakis, the
Court reiterated that "national authorities are in principle better
placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and
conditions."' 6  Furthermore, it saw fit to add, the doctrine is
"particularly appropriate when it comes to the regulation by
Contracting States of the wearing of religious symbols in teaching
institutions.
37
So what, if anything, can be concluded with an immediate
jurisprudential comparison between the Sahin and SB cases? The
first and most obvious conclusion is the apparent inconsistency.
Leyla Sahin was denied a right to cover her head, whilst Shabina
Begum was granted one. The courts in both cases further appreciated
this inconsistency when they surveyed approaches to the issue across
Europe. In France, where the principle of laicism might be said to
have originated, schoolgirls are presently subject to expulsion for
wearing the hi]ab.38 However, in the Netherlands, Germany, and
Austria, the country to which, interestingly, Leyla Sahin moved to
35. Id. at T 81, 84,114.
36. Id. at TT 100 (citing Handyside v. The United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) (1976)).
37. Id. at T 102.
38. A policy recently confirmed by legislation passed in March 2004, which is
designed to provide a more vigorous alternative to the endeavors of the rather
whimsically termed 'scarf mediator,' hired by the Education Ministry to stand at the
school gates and persuade girls to voluntarily remove their scarves. The ban, which
was originally recommended by the Stasi report, has attracted accusations of
"institutionalized Islamophobia." For an account, see The War on Headscarves, THE
ECONOMIST, July 2, 2004; John R. Bowen, Muslims and Citizens: France's headscarf
controversy, 29 BOSTON REV. 31 (2004), available at
<www.bostonreview.net/BR29.1/Bowen.html>; Jeremy Gunn, Under God but Not the
Scarf. The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in the United States and Laicite in
France, 46 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE 7, (2004) at 1-41. I am grateful to
Catherine Phuong for providing me with much of the material on this particular
instance of the French ban on headscarves in schools.
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study, courts have already affirmed that the wearing of headscarves is
part of a right to liberty of religious conscience.
A second conclusion relates to the strategic resolution of these
inconsistencies. Although both courts countenanced the broader
constitutional and cultural aspects, both were also quick to shy away
from them. As we have already noted, the Court of Appeal in SB
preferred to reach its decision on a relatively tight technicality. The
Strasbourg Court sought similar recourse behind the "margin of
appreciation." This leads to a third conclusion, one which relates to
the very efficacy of the law itself. We shall revisit this conclusion in
the final part of this essay. It speaks to the suspicion that the law is an
inappropriate discipline and institution with which to try to resolve or
ameliorate this kind of political, cultural, and theological dilemma.
Ka's Story
Our final narrative is placed in Kars; a real, and an imaginary,
city in the far east of Turkey. Kars is real insofar as it does actually
exist. But it is also imaginary, insofar as a particular 'Kars' is
deployed by the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk in Snow. Pamuk's
novels have long enjoyed critical acclaim in the West, and a mixture
of applause and visceral hatred in his native Turkey. Snow is the
most recent, and perhaps most controversial, of his novels.39 At the
novel's center is a sequence of themes and narratives relating to
headscarves. Pamuk uses the headscarf precisely as a semiotic for
discussing a variety of political, cultural, and theological issues that
presently pervade Turkish and, at a remove, European society.
The plot of Snow is centered around the return visit of a poet Ka
to his hometown of Kars, situated in the far east of Turkey. Ka has
been exiled in Germany for many years, but has returned in order to
replenish his creative energies, and to seek out a former love, Ipek. °
During his visit to Kars, there is a military coup carried out by a
handful of renegade officers who are able to take momentary
advantage of the fact that the city is cut off from the rest of the
country by heavy snowfall. The coup is triggered by the performance
39. Leading THE NEW STATESMAN tO appraise him as "one of the world's finest
writers," and critics such as Joan Smith and Maureen Freely to prophesy a Nobel
Prize. See the Joan Smith's interview with Pamuk, published in THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, available at <www.orhanpamuk.net/interviews.htm>. Pamuk won the
prestigious Impac Prize in 2003, for My NAME IS RED, which sold over 200,000 copies
in Turkey alone. The first run of SNOW sold 140,000 copies in Turkey.
40. ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW 92-3 (Maureen Freely trans., Faber & Faber 2004).
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of a play that has been designed to impress the virtues of secular
Turkey over and against Islamicist alternatives. The symbolic
removal of a headscarf provides, as we shall see, the key dramatic
moment in this play. The picture that Pamuk paints of Kars is of fear
and tension. Fear grips the 'soul.'41
The immediate pretext for Ka's visit is a desire to investigate a
'plague' of female suicides. In each instance, the girl's death appears
to be directly related to abuse, either mental or physical, suffered at
the hands of male members of her family.' Ipek puts it pithily: "The
men give themselves to religion, and the women kill themselves."43 It
quickly becomes apparent that these suicides are directly related to
ongoing political and cultural tensions, and the most famous relate to
the so-called 'headscarf girls;' girls subject, in Pamuk's fiction, to the
same laws and social pressures that afflict the real lives of young
Turkish women such as Leyla Sahin.
The 'headscarf girl' who had already committed suicide in Kars,
Teslime, had informed her father that, as she could not cover her
head in college, and as so many of her friends seemed to have
abandoned their religious principles by conforming with secular
demands, her "life had no meaning."' As one of her friends later
confirmed, for Teslime, "the headscarf did not just stand for God's
love; it also proclaimed her faith and preserved her honour."45 The
same sentiment is voiced by the radical Islamist leader, Blue, who
tries to convince Ka that "these girls who for the love of God find
themselves caught between their schools and their families are so
miserable and so alone that they see no course of action but to imitate
the suicidal martyrs., 46  The seeming compatibility between
patriarchalism and compassion presents an uncomfortable tension.
Pamuk's 'headscarf girls' are clearly subjected to enormous
pressures, from both those who demand they cover up and those who
demand that they do not. Hamde, one of the girls pressured in Snow,
confesses that it has reached the point where she can no longer
"concentrate," and is haunted by the realization that, through no fault
of her own, she is destined to be "despised" by one party or the other.
41. Id. at 182-4.
42. Id. at 13-15.
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. Id. at 121.
46. Id. at 77.
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She would like to be able to decide for herself, but liberty is
something she will never enjoy.47 Kalife voices a similar resentment,
condemning those men "who waste so much effort to gain exposure
themselves while we endure so much to protect our privacy," as well
as a press that so often fails to appreciate the real hurt of "women
whose lives have been ruined.
4 8
The essential tensions in the novel are played out most strikingly
in the city's theater, first in the initial performance of the play
provocatively entitled "My Fatherland, My Headscarf," and then
again in the later version of Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy, redrafted to
reprise the symbolic denigration of the headscarf. 9 The successive
instances of political allegory provide a peculiarly modernist
'phantasmic' narrative, making the distinction between fact and
fiction, politics and text ever more difficult to discern." The
centerpiece of both performances sees the leading lady remove her
headscarf. In the first instance, in case anyone had missed the
symbolism, the actress took care to confirm that "she was talking
about our souls, because the scarf, the fez, the turban and the
headdress were all symbols of the reactionary darkness of our souls,
from which we should liberate ourselves and run to join the modern
nations of the West." 51
For the actor-manager, Sunay, who was in league with the
renegade officers, the justification for the entire performance lay in
the need to bring "enlightenment" to Turkey, while the blame for the
ensuing chaos lay with the "cobwebbed minds" that seek to
perpetuate political and cultural "darkness."52 Those who wish to
perpetuate the culture of Islam in Turkey, the implications follow, are
also those who seem happy to condemn their countrymen and women
47. Id. at 124-6.
48. Id. at 241, 405-06. The conclusion finds an echo in Aksu Bora's observation
that "men in power should not use women's bodies for a battlefield." See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH'S CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, AND ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN WHO WEAR THE
HEADSCARF (JUNE 2004), available at
<www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/6.htm>. The same sentiment is voiced
in Nancy J. Hirschmann, Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question of Free
Agency, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 345, 351 (1998).
49. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 341.
50. See Sibel Irzik, Allegorical Lives: The Public and Private in the Modern
Turkish Novel, 102 S. Atlantic Q. 551, 561-3 (2003).
51. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 155.
52. Id. at 158.
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to lives of inexorable poverty, "misery and despair. 53 Sunay deals in
stark alternatives.
As Pamuk implies, however, for many of his compatriots the
issue is not so simple and certainly not so compelling. Not everyone
is so sure about the 'West.' The leading lady's harangue is met with
an immediate response from the audience, "So why not take off
everything and run to Europe stark naked?" Within the context of
the 'West,' and its presumed attractions, the more particular
European dimension is pervasive. The exchange between the actor-
manager, Sunay, and one of the 'headscarf girls,' Kalife, who is
blackmailed into performing the leading role in the second
performance, is framed by the former's suggestion that Europeans
will "applaud" the removal of the headscarf, and the latter's counter,
wondering if they will then applaud her resultant suicide with the
same enthusiasm.54 The exchange speaks volumes; the paradox is
immediate, and seemingly irreducible.
It is precisely this tension that founds the first serious act of
violence in the novel - the murder of the school director by the father
of an excluded 'headscarf girl.' "If we continue to worship women
who take off their headscarves and just about everything else," the
director's assassin anxiously demands, "don't we run the risk of
degrading our women as we have seen so many women degraded in
the wake of the sexual revolution?"55 The lengthy transcript of the
conversation between the two, recorded in the moments leading up to
the shooting, visits a sequence of debates on Koranic texts relating to
clothing and their interpretation. Significantly, these debates just
seem to inflame the assassin.56
The first theatrical performance, which is intended to trigger a
violent response by Islamic fundamentalists, and thus in turn lend
some legitimacy to the prospective military coup, is advertised as a
"tribute for Ataturk."57 The same political sympathies underpin the
second performance, too. In both instances, as Ka appreciates, the
"artistic triumph" carries with it "profound political consequences. '5 8
As expected, one form of theater gives way to another. The tension
53. Id. at 198-9.
54. Id. at 410.
55. Id. at 42.
56. Id. at 38-49.
57. Id. at 28-9.
58. Id. at 341.
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was not, of course, alleviated by the following scene in the first play,
in which the newly liberated leading lady is duly raped by two
bearded fanatics as a punishment for her insolence. Riot,
unsurprisingly, ensues.
The divisiveness of the issue is further underlined in the novel by
the fact that the two sisters, Ipek and Kalife, around whom much of
the novel revolves, assume such different positions regarding the
headscarf. Kalife, as we have already noted, is one of the 'headscarf
girls.' She wears it as a "revolutionary gesture," a gesture of
"rebellion" against the state; an attitude which reflects the
contemporary view that Islam in modern Turkey is a "culture of
protest."5 9 It is her willingness to remove her headscarf in the second
play, in large part a gesture bred of despair, which triggers the final
denouement of the novel.6°  Ipek, however, is far less certain,
oscillating between the apparent attractions of both Islam and the
West. Her interest in the headscarf tends to oscillate accordingly.1
The intense symbolic import of Kalife's headscarf, and the
intense futility of her agony, is beautifully captured in the words of
her tortured admirer Fazil:
No one will remember us; no one will care what
happened to us. We'll spend the rest of our days here
arguing about what sort of scarf women should wrap
around their heads, and no one will care in the
slightest as we're eaten up by our own petty, idiotic
quarrels. When I see so many people around me
leading such stupid lives and then vanishing without a
trace, an anger runs through me because I know then
nothing really matters in life more than love.62
II. The Place of Stories
The juxtaposition of the trivial with the momentous is just one of
the themes weaving its way through Snow. Pamuk has Ka confirm his
despair, at a city, a nation, and a humanity, that can invest so much
59. Id. at 116. For a discussion of Islam as a "culture of protest," see Nachmani,
supra note 30, at 97-9. For a commentary on the possibility of veil-wearing as a
symbol of struggle against secular, often imperialist, oppression, see Norma Claire
Moruzzi, A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and
Social Identity, 22 POLITICAL THEORY 653,663 (1994).
60. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 288-9, 314-15.
61. Id. at 397-8.
62. Id. at 294.
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energy and so much hatred in such "asinine political feuds."63 It is this
intense futility which must be overcome, if the agonism which it
nurtures is to be countered. It is here that textuality becomes so
important, and literary form so vital. Where legal and political
institutions are so obviously limited in their capacity to forge
understanding, still less consensus, literature can promote the
overwhelming necessity of talking, and more importantly still,
listening." The dilemmas revealed by issues such as headscarves
cannot be resolved in any precise, particularly any legalistic, sense.
There are no rabbits to be pulled out of hats. Judges in London or
Strasbourg are no more equipped to perform this magic than judges
in Ankara. This is the first and perhaps most compelling conclusion
that can be drawn from cases such as SB and Sahin.
A second conclusion is the more reassuring thought that the
apparent limits of the law as a mechanism for deciding issues of deep
ethical and theological polarity, such as headscarves, should not
preclude the urge to achieve some kind of amelioration of the dispute
in question. There are two possible, and potentially complementary,
approaches here. One is to explore the various arguments that
oscillate around the idea of multiculturalism and its somewhat vexed
relation with liberalism. A second is to dig deeper into the
possibilities of inter-textual dialogue.
Multiculturalism remains an issue of considerable controversy,
not least in areas where there appears to be a particular gender
context. At first glance the controversy can be cast in terms of a
simple polarity - should individual rights, as championed by liberal
jurists and commentators 'trump,' to use the renowned Dworkinian
metaphor, group or cultural rights. The multicultural cause has been
most famously championed by those of an overtly communitarian
sympathy such as Will Kymlicka. According to Kymlicka, the self-
respect that liberals recognize as being central to the idea of human
dignity depends, in considerable part, upon membership of a "rich
and secure cultural structure., 65 It is for this reason that liberalism
must also respect, and indeed protect, the identifiable rights of
cultural groups. Political morality, he contends, is always prescribed
by "shared moral beliefs," taken in the main from a "range of
63. Id. at 338.
64. Hirschmann, supra note 49, at 363.




options" that is "determined by our cultural heritage." 66 Protection of
group rights must, accordingly, "form an important part of a
recognizably liberal theory of equality.,
67
It is against Kymlicka, and fellow communitarian travelers, that
Susan Moller Okin levels her critique of multiculturalism in her
much-debated essay Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?
Acknowledging that the "tension between feminism and
multiculturalism" is "deep and growing," Moller Okin advises
feminists to "remain skeptical" of arguments that seek to justify
systematic inequality in the cause of "cultural diversity." There is a
tendency, she notes, for such "group rights," more often than not
cherished by innately patriarchal theologies, to be "antifeminist," to
"limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to live with
human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as freely
chosen lives as they can., 69 Perceptively noting that 'culture' is an
irreducibly fluid and narrative conception, "rich and timeworn
grammar of human activity," Bonnie Honig likewise warns that the
"fragile gains of feminism may be attenuated by heightened
multicultural sensitivities."'7
The controversy that oscillates around the issue of headscarves
encapsulates much of the debate surrounding liberalism,
multiculturalism and gender." According to Moller Okin, the French
experience, in seeking to ban headscarves while "quietly permitting"
what she perceives to be the equally oppressive practice of polygamy,
amongst immigrants, reveals precisely the kind of fundamental
incoherence that tends to nurtured by an over-anxious concern for so-
66. Id. at 68, 165.
67. Id at 190. Kymlicka's desire to accommodate liberal feminism and
multiculturalism is reiterated in his reply to Susan Moller Okin, in which he affirms,
"I see multiculturalism and feminism as allies engaged in related struggles for a more
inclusive conception of justice." Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 34 (Joshua Cohen,
Matthew Howard, & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., Princeton University Press 1999).
68. Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in OKIN, supra note 67, at 10-11.
69. The "drive to control women," Okin affirms, is at the heart of all theologies.
Id. at 12, 13-14, 17.
70. Bonnie Honig, My Culture Made Me Do It, in OKIN, supra note 67 at 35, 39.
71. For a relatively early example of the complexity, and heat, which the debate
can raise, see Anna E. Galeotti, Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration,
21 POLITICAL THEORY 585, 585-605 (1993), and Moruzzi, supra note 60, at 653-72
(critical of Galeotti's attempt to present a nuanced, but still committed, defense of
the liberal argument in support of laws banning headscarves, in this particular
instance French laws).
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called cultural 'rights.'72 The 'horns' of this particular 'dilemma,' as
Nancy Hirschmann has noted, is predictable, located in the desire to
respect cultural specificity, but troubled too by the suspicion, pressed
by the likes of Moller Okin, that such specificity is simply a mask for
gender oppression.73 The dilemma is exacerbated, of course, by the
fact that while many women feel that a headscarf ban is an
infringement of their liberty to obey religious injunction, many others
feel that it serves to protect them from precisely the same religious
injunction which, in their perception, seeks to restrict their freedom.
The paradoxes abound; for as Hirschmann then posits, the
determination to prevent veiling, in order to liberate women, simply
becomes another example of reinscribing "women's bodies as
symbols of culture," in this instance a Western, liberal culture.74
Ultimately, however, like Moller Okin, Hirschmann remains
skeptical of claimed 'rights' to cover up, wondering if this assumed
religious 'duty' can really be conceptualized as an expression of
liberty.75 The failure to bring what she terms "a critical perspective to
bear on their experiences" leads some women in certain cultural
contexts to assume, often unquestioningly, the veracity of theological
injunctions that are undeniably patriarchal. Such women would, by
implication, include the likes of Shabina Begum and Leyla Sahin, as
well as Pamuk's Kalife. Such a false consciousness, continues
Hirschmann, traps "women more deeply in repressive contexts by
simultaneously binding them to their entrapment., 76 Devoted to the
theology that pretends to furnish such codes with a necessary
legitimacy, women actually come to embrace, even defend, their
symbolic repression.7
Alongside more specifically feminist anxieties, there is also the
wider context described by the Koranic texts which seek to regulate
dress, and their interpretation. The Koran, it is commonly argued,
simply enjoins women, like men, to dress with a measure of decorum,
and 'not to display their charms beyond what may be apparent
thereof.' Thereon, as Hirchmann, and Islamic experts such as Malise
72. OKIN, supra note 67, at 9-10.
73. Noting that such "diverse views suggest that the veil is both a marker of
autonomy, individuality, and identity, and a marker of inequality, and sexist
oppression." Hirschmann, supra note 49, at 352.
74. Id. at 350.
75. Id. at 361 (the same suggestion is made by Galeotti, supra note 71, at 587-8).
76. Hirschmann, supra note 49, at 359.
77. Id. at 361.
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Ruthven, have argued, it becomes a matter of scriptural
interpretation, and also, inevitably, of political, gendered,
interpretation too. And it is here that interpretation so easily
becomes distortion."8  What is lacking, critically, is a uniform
acceptance of what 'decorum' really means. Instead there are simply
various interpretations. This does not denigrate the symbolic
importance of the issue. But it does reinforce its essentially
indeterminate and indeterminable nature. And it also means, as
Noah Feldman has recently argued, that there is no necessary
incompatibility between Islamic theology and principles of liberty and
equality. It just means that there might be in certain instances where
the tradition in Islamic scholarship is especially conservative or
'fundamental.'79
There is little here that is certain, and much that remains a
matter of fierce debate.8" In this circumstance, much depends upon
somehow fashioning a dialogue, in due course perhaps even an
accommodation between a multicultural respect for difference, and
liberal injunctions of fundamental, individual equality; what
Hirschmann terms a "cross-cultural dialogue" which requires of all
parties a commitment, above all, to "listen.",8' It is here that textuality
offers itself as a potentially valuable strategy; more especially a
textuality that presumes the need to respect diversity and, like it or
not, conceptual indeterminacy.' Unlike the discipline of law, which
presumes determinacy, or at least the illusion of it, textuality
acknowledges, even embraces, indeterminacy. As such it is
concerned not with accessing some kind of 'right answer,' but in
nurturing an alternative kind of justice, understood as the facility of
understanding and the tolerance of essential differences.
It would be a mistake to presume a more imperial aspiration.
Narrativity, as one of its most determined champions, Martha
Nussbaum, admits, cannot replace the recourse to the law, and nor
should it aspire to do so. But it can lend a necessary supplement, and
in areas of dispute such as those described by the challenges of
78. Id. at 354-5, and MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 172-73 (Penguin
1991).
79. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC
DEMOCRACY 66-67, 75-77, 184 (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux 2004).
80. See Moruzzi, supra note 60 at 654 (emphasising the "complex, multilayered"
nature of the "problem" of headscarves).
81. Hirschmann, supra note 49, at 363.
82. See Galeotti, supra note 71, at 597-602.
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multiculturalism, the necessity is all the greater and more obvious.83
In a specific reply to Moller Okin's critique of multiculturalism,
Nussbaum accepts the caution that "the current liberal interest in
multiculturalism holds grave dangers for women's equality," but
expresses an equal concern with the kind of "comprehensive
liberalism" that holds culture, particularly religious culture, in
"contempt." ' What matters most, Nussbaum presses, is a willingness
to commence with a "respect for the different lives of our fellow
citizens" and an equal preparedness to embrace the "complexity" of
the "task" of accommodation and toleration.85
As she similarly argues in Sex and Social Justice, liberalism must
recognize the "plurality of views," moral, political, and cultural, which
pervade modern society.86 This should not be allowed to become an
excuse for the infringement of basic human rights and "capabilities"
and their unarguable "priority," but it does advise a vital note of
caution in approaching the challenges of multiculturalism.87
Liberalism, and the defense of rights of personal liberty and equality,
can be determined and assured, but also open and tolerant. The
liberals who have "reasoned the matter out," and who recognize the
reality of inequality and oppression based on gender, whether it is
located in the practice of genital mutilation, polygamy or the
imposition of dress codes, should not be intimidated.' But they
should also be prepared to listen to the "narratives of women,"
whether they are a defense of cultural practice or complaint against
it.89 Such a "universalist feminism," as she argues elsewhere, can be
both skeptical of oppressive theologies, and ready to apply "moral
constraints" against their more "iniquitous" practices, while also
founded on the a willingness to nurture "our thoughts about
difference."9°
It is a conclusion that chimes with Nussbaum's other writings in
which she urges the case for resolving, or at least approaching, moral
83. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 11-12 (Beacon Press 1995).
84.Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in OKIN, supra note 67, at 105, 108.
85. Id. at 114.
86. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 115 (Oxford University
Press 1999).
87. Id. at 102.
88. Id. at 129.
89. Id.
90. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 7, 190-92 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
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and jurisprudential dilemmas through the "literary imagination."9 In
Poetic Justice, she emphasizes the limited value of adopting a
rigorously legalistic liberalism, of the "detached" and "non-narrative"
kind.92 If anything can help us try to understand the challenges
presented by the apparent 'clash' of civilizations, in global politics or
just at the local school gates, it is the deployment of this "literary
imagination. '" 93 In language that speaks very obviously to these kinds
of challenges, she affirms: "I defend the literary imagination precisely
because it seems to me an essential ingredient of an ethical stance
that asks us to concern ourselves with the good of other people whose
lives are different from our own.,
94
In a published interview, given before the publication of Snow,
Pamuk suggested that acts of violence are very often caused by
perceived personal slights; not by simple adherence to some grand
ideology or theology, but by a feeling of 'degradation' brought about
by the perception that a dearly held view is simply not 'understood,'
and that no one is making the effort to remedy this slight.95 The
observation is perceptive. If one theme underpins Pamuk's novel, it
is this need to nurture an understanding of the condition - moral,
political, and cultural - of the Other. At a remove, for Pamuk
certainly, this becomes a need to nurture "love and compassion;" a
conclusion that echoes Nussbaum's assertion that "poetic justice" is a
justice which presents itself as "intimate and impartial, loving without
bias., 96 Pamuk's poet needs to recover a sense of the "commonalty of
love," and so, the implication follows, do we all.9  Such a
commonality can only flourish in an environment that tolerates
difference, one in which effective justice is just as much dependent
upon emotional maturity as it is the strength of its juristic reasoning.98
91. Nussbaum, supra note 82, at xvi.
92. Id. at 114.
93. See id. at 65-67.
94. Id. at xvi.
95. See his comments in Orphan Pamuk, The Anger of the Damned, THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 15, 2001, at 12, available at
<www.nybooks.com/articles/14763>.
96. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 6; NUSSBAUM, supra note 82, at 120. See generally
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 53, 65-6 (Cambridge University Press 2001).
97. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 244.
98. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 82, at 33, 49-50, 399 (observing that morality
without emotion or compassion is as "dangerously empty and rootless," as emotion
without moral grounding is "quirky and unreliable").
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Robin West suggests that this desire, and ability, to foster
"connection," to infuse political and legal morality with an "ethic of
care," has emerged as a "uniquely" feminist aspiration in modern
legal and literary theory. 99 She also suggests, like Nussbaum, that
narrativity offers itself as a peculiarly valuable medium with which to
approach issues of gender inequality.'m The claim is credible, but
neither the capacity nor the aspiration is entirely unique. Its value as
a medium for ameliorating the tensions between liberalism and
multiculturalism is just as credible. The same kind of aspiration, and
sentiment, can be discerned in Bhikhu Parekh's desire to nurture
a multicultural theory of liberalism that both cherishes and
appreciates the limitations of the great liberal values, assigns them
their proper but limited place in the moral world, and provides a
framework of thought and action in which different cultures can
cooperatively explore their differences and create a rich and lively
community based on their respective insights. 1
Of course, Parekh's political vision might be rather more
communitarian than that espoused by West or Nussbaum. But that
does not detract from the consonance of their shared aspirations.
A court of law provides limited opportunities to either explore or
ameliorate anything much, aside from resolving the kind of narrow
legal arguments that were finally deployed to effect some kind of
juristic closure in SB and Sahin. As West concludes, the "man of
justice" who "steels himself so steadfastly against the pull of natural
compassion" pronounces, more often than not, a justice that is
"cramped, often dishonest."' ' If a "commonalty of love," or even just
a politics of dignity and tolerance, is to be accessed, a far better
strategy is to deploy literary and narrative supplements, such as that
presented in Pamuk's Snow. If there is a mutual understanding to be
had, it will be recovered by listening to those voices in those texts that
embrace the indeterminacies eschewed by legalism. What an inter-
textual engagement, a willingness to speak and to listen, can do is
flesh out the deeper cultural and ethical context. It broadens the
narrative, and in so doing, nurtures the capacity for better
understanding.
99. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 6, 19, 24 (New York University Press
1997) (emphasizing the interrelatedness of the "ethic of justice" and the "ethic of
care").
100. Id. at 207-17.
101. Bhikhu Parekh, A More Varied Love, in Okin, supra note 67, at 74-5.
102. WEST, supra note 92, at 43.
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Elsewhere Pamuk has suggested that the tensions that presently
haunt modern Turkey, as they have for two centuries or more, can be
traced to a fear that "our stories are lost."'' 3 Other critics, such as
Sibel Irzik, have similarly impressed the extent to which this fear of
cultural and narrative erasure underpins so much of contemporary
Turkish and Islamic anxiety regarding the prospect of
"westernization."' °  It represents part of a pervasive "cultural
pessimism.""1 5  The point is well made. As Turkey, and its sixty
million, almost exclusively Islamic citizens, ponder the prospect of
acceding to the European Union, it is vital that the West strives to
dilute the perception that it represents an immediate threat to
indigenous cultural tradition. As Pamuk's poet notes, the more
strident, and violent, voices of political Islam feed on this
perception.' °6 If both Turkey and the 'new' Europe that it wishes to
join are to nurture the "evolution of a genuinely multicultural"
society, much, as Ziya Onis has observed, will depend upon fostering
a reciprocal willingness to listen.
In the preface to the most recent edition of Orientalism, written
in 2003, Edward Said spoke to the need to promote this willingness,
and to deploy it as a counter against simplistic anti-Islamic hyperbole.
There is, he emphasized, a "difference" between "knowledge of other
peoples and other times that is the result of understanding,
compassion, careful understanding and analysis for their own sakes"
and knowledge that is "part of an overall campaign of self-
affirmation, belligerency and outright war."' 8 The former is designed
to promote "humanistic enlargement," the latter to add a spurious
legitimacy to strategies of "control and external dominion."'" The
necessary engagement must strive to nurture what Said terms the
103. See his comments in, Orhan Pamuk, You Should Fear Us, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 1, 2005, Arts at 15.
104. Irzik, supra note 51, at 551-53.
105. N.Canefe & T.Bora, 'Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in
Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism,' in A.Carkoglu &
B.Rubin (eds), Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic
Integration and International Dynamics, (Frank Cass 2003), 139-41.
106. PAMUK, supra note 41, at 63, 69.
107. Z. Onis, 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State:
Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era,' in Carkoglu & Rubin, supra note 98,
at 27.
108. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THE ORIENT xiv
(Penguin Books 2003).
109. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THE ORIENT xiv
(Penguin Books 2003).
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"humanistic spirit:"
Rather than the manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to
concentrate on the slow working together of cultures that overlap,
borrow from each other, and live together in far more interesting
ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can
allow."1
Such a "humanism" is the "only" and the "final resistance we
have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure
human history." ... It is "centered upon the agency of human
individuality and subjective intuition, rather than on received ideas
and approved authority," and it is found most readily in those "texts"
that are "produced and live on in the historical realm in all sorts of
what I have called worldly ways.
11 2
Pamuk has aligned himself with precisely such a textual politics,
advising that "other peoples in other continents and civilizations are
actually exactly like you and you can learn this through literature. ' 3
What "matters," accordingly, is "not civilizations but human lives,
little things about daily life - little smells, colors and atmosphere of
daily life and little stories that we live."11 4 His final injunction is as
abrupt as it is crystal clear: "Pay attention to good literature and
novels, and do not believe in politicians."1 5 Snow allows us to do just
this, to discern, through text, the genuinely 'humanistic' in 'spirit.' It
allows us to appreciate the dilemmas, expressed so eloquently by
Kadife, Shabina Begum and Leyla Sahin, that the symbolism, the
culture, and the politics of headscarves engenders. At the very end of
Snow, Pamuk has his narrator conclude with the observation, "How
much can we ever know about the love and pain in another's
heart?"1"6 We are unlikely to find the answer in the dusty courtrooms
of London, Istanbul, or Strasbourg.
110. Id. at xxii.
111. Id. at xxii..
112. Id. at xxii, 93-4, 123.
113. Comments made in an interview with Elizabeth Farnsworth on The News








On March 22, 2006, the Appellate Committee of the House of
Lords gave judgment on the appeal of the Headteachers and
Governors of Denbigh High School against the decision of the Court
of Appeal in the case of The Queen on the Application of SB [2005]
EWCA (Civ) 199, 2005 2 All ER 396 (EWCA (Civ)) (Eng.). The
judgment is given at [2006] UKHL 15. The House reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeal. It did so unanimously. The House
was of the opinion that Shabina Begum's rights under Article 9 of the
European Convention were not infringed. It was held that the Article
right addressed questions of substance not procedure, and that it was
unreasonable to expect a board of school Governors to have
addressed itself differently. And as a matter of substance, the school
uniform policy was 'objectively justified,' reasonable, and
proportionate in terms of any potential infringement of Article 9
rights. From the outset, Lord Bingham, in the leading judgment, was
at pains to insist that the House would not venture any ruling on
whether any particular "feature of Islamic dress should or should not
be permitted in the schools of this country.""' 7  Baroness Hale,
however, was prepared to acknowledge the wider gender implications
in a situation where young Muslim women might feel themselves
pressured by men, or even other women, into wearing certain
garments. The responsibility of a good school, she commented, is to
alleviate such pressures."'
117 R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v.
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2] (Eng.),
available at
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld20056/ldjudgmt/jdO6O322/begum-4.htm>.
118 Id. at T 97.
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